The collective value: A new solution for games with coalition structures

研究成果: Article査読

10 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this study, we provide a new solution for cooperative games with coalition structures. The collective value of a player is defined as the sum of the equal division of the pure surplus obtained by his coalition from the coalitional bargaining and of his Shapley value for the internal coalition. The weighted Shapley value applied to a game played by coalitions with coalition-size weights is assigned to each coalition, reflecting the size asymmetries among coalitions. We show that the collective value matches exogenous interpretations of coalition structures and provide an axiomatic foundation of this value. A noncooperative mechanism that implements the collective value is also presented.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)572-589
ページ数18
ジャーナルTOP
21
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2013 10
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Information Systems and Management

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