The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments

Mamoru Kaneko*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

7 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper attempts to define a new solution concept for n-person noncooperative games. The idea of it is close to that of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set, more precisely, is based on their 'standards of behavior' interpretation of the stable set. This new approach enables us to consider new interesting problems of information. Further this approach gives us a plausible interpretation of the Nash equilibrium concept. This paper provides the definition and considers certain general properties of our solution concept. Further we consider our solution concept for zero-sum two-person games, the prisoner's dilemma, the battle of the sexes and several simple games with a continuum of players.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)93-128
ページ数36
ジャーナルMathematical Social Sciences
13
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1987
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学、確率および不確実性
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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