The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies

Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders

研究成果: Article査読

24 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

When permissible coalitions in finite economies are constrained to be small relative to the player set, the continuum model with finite coalitions and its f-core are the limits of large finite economies and their ε-cores. We show convergence both of game-theoretic structures-relatively small coalitions in the finite economies converge to finite coalitions-and of solutions-ε-cores converge to the f-core. Our convergence is carried out in the context of exchange economies with widespread externalities where the requirement that coalitions be small is critical.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)135-168
ページ数34
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Theory
49
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1989
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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