The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach

Yukihiko Funaki*, Takehiko Yamato

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

40 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper we consider a model of an economy with a common pool resource. Under decreasing returns to scale, it is well-known that no Nash equilibrium attains Pareto efficiency. We examine whether it is possible to achieve Pareto efficiency and avoid the tragedy of the commons through cooperation among players. For that purpose, we use the notion of a game in partition function form. Whether or not the core exists depends crucially on the expectations of each coalition regarding the coalition formation of the outsiders. If each coalition has pessimistic expectations, then the core always exists, while if it has optimistic expectations, the core may be empty.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)157-171
ページ数15
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
28
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1999 5月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • 数学(その他)
  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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