The dynamic transformation of political systems through social contract: A game theoretic approach

Akira Okada, Kenichi Sakakibara, Koichi Suga

研究成果: Article

1 引用 (Scopus)

抜粋

We consider how the political system of the state evolves in the process of economic development. We present a dynamic public goods economy with non-overlapping generations, which confronts the free-rider problem without the state. In each generation, individuals enter under the unanimous rule a social contract of the political system, either monarchy or democracy, and then attempt to establish the state under the contracted political system. If the state is established, it provides public goods by enforcing tax on its members. Our game theoretic analysis shows: (i) the state can be established if and only if social productivity in terms of the capital stock of public goods is lower than a critical level; (ii) individuals choose democracy if social productivity is sufficiently high, while monarchy may be chosen if it is not; (iii) social productivity stochastically converges to the critical level over generations; and (iv) a simulation result shows several transformation patterns of political systems.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)1-21
ページ数21
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
14
発行部数1
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 1996 1 1
外部発表Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

フィンガープリント The dynamic transformation of political systems through social contract: A game theoretic approach' の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらはともに一意のフィンガープリントを構成します。

  • これを引用