The dynamic transformation of political systems through social contract: A game theoretic approach

Akira Okada, Kenichi Sakakibara, Koichi Suga

研究成果: Article

抄録

We consider how the political system of the state evolves in the process of economic development. We present a dynamic public goods economy with non-overlapping generations, which confronts the free-rider problem without the state. In each generation, individuals enter under the unanimous rule a social contract of the political system, either monarchy or democracy, and then attempt to establish the state under the contracted political system. If the state is established, it provides public goods by enforcing tax on its members. Our game theoretic analysis shows: (i) the state can be established if and only if social productivity in terms of the capital stock of public goods is lower than a critical level; (ii) individuals choose democracy if social productivity is sufficiently high, while monarchy may be chosen if it is not; (iii) social productivity stochastically converges to the critical level over generations; and (iv) a simulation result shows several transformation patterns of political systems.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)1-21
ページ数21
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
14
発行部数1
出版物ステータスPublished - 1996
外部発表Yes

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political system
monarchy
productivity
social democracy
taxes
democracy
simulation
economy
Political system
Social contract
economics
Productivity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

これを引用

The dynamic transformation of political systems through social contract : A game theoretic approach. / Okada, Akira; Sakakibara, Kenichi; Suga, Koichi.

:: Social Choice and Welfare, 巻 14, 番号 1, 1996, p. 1-21.

研究成果: Article

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