The instability of John Rawls's stability for the right reasons

Hun Chung

研究成果: Review article

3 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

John Rawls's most mature notion of political order is stability for the right reasons. Stability for the right reasons is the kind of political order that Rawls hoped a well-ordered society could ideally achieve. In this paper, I demonstrate through the tools of modern game theory, the instability of stability for the right reasons. Specifically, I will show that a well-ordered society can completely destabilize by the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of non-compliers whenever individuals fail to achieve full common knowledge ever so slightly.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)1-17
ページ数17
ジャーナルEpisteme
16
発行部数1
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2019 3 1
外部発表Yes

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John Rawls
Political Order
Common Knowledge
Game Theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History and Philosophy of Science

これを引用

The instability of John Rawls's stability for the right reasons. / Chung, Hun.

:: Episteme, 巻 16, 番号 1, 01.03.2019, p. 1-17.

研究成果: Review article

Chung, Hun. / The instability of John Rawls's stability for the right reasons. :: Episteme. 2019 ; 巻 16, 番号 1. pp. 1-17.
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