The instability of John Rawls's stability for the right reasons

Hun Chung*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Review article査読

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

John Rawls's most mature notion of political order is stability for the right reasons. Stability for the right reasons is the kind of political order that Rawls hoped a well-ordered society could ideally achieve. In this paper, I demonstrate through the tools of modern game theory, the instability of stability for the right reasons. Specifically, I will show that a well-ordered society can completely destabilize by the introduction of an arbitrarily small number of non-compliers whenever individuals fail to achieve full common knowledge ever so slightly.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)1-17
ページ数17
ジャーナルEpisteme
16
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2019 3 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 科学史および科学哲学

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