The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game

Brian Roberson, Dmitriy Kvasov

研究成果: Article

29 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

The Colonel Blotto game is a two-player constant-sum game in which each player simultaneously distributes his fixed level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players' resources are "use it or lose it" in the sense that any resources that are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited. This article examines a non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game that relaxes this use it or lose it feature. We find that if the level of asymmetry between the players' budgets is below a threshold, then there exists a one-to-one mapping from the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distribution functions in the constant-sum game to those in the non-constant-sum game. Once the asymmetry of the players' budgets exceeds the threshold, this relationship breaks down and we construct a new equilibrium.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)397-433
ページ数37
ジャーナルEconomic Theory
51
発行部数2
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2012 10
外部発表Yes

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Resources
Asymmetry
Contests
Breakdown
Distribution function

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

これを引用

The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game. / Roberson, Brian; Kvasov, Dmitriy.

:: Economic Theory, 巻 51, 番号 2, 10.2012, p. 397-433.

研究成果: Article

Roberson, Brian ; Kvasov, Dmitriy. / The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game. :: Economic Theory. 2012 ; 巻 51, 番号 2. pp. 397-433.
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