The nonemptiness of the f-core of a game without side payments

Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders

研究成果: Article査読

23 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions - ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality - are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)245-258
ページ数14
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
25
2
出版ステータスPublished - 1996
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

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