The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

Mamoru Kaneko

研究成果: Article

72 引用 (Scopus)

抜粋

An economic model of the allocation process with public goods is presented. We define a concept of equilibrium and prove the existence. Next we present a voting game in which a level of the public goods to be produced is decided. We prove that the core of the voting game and the equilibria exist simultaneously, and that they coincide.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)123-136
ページ数14
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Theory
16
発行部数2
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 1977
外部発表Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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