The unbinding core for coalitional form games

Takaaki Abe*, Yukihiko Funaki

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

In this paper, we introduce a new core concept called the unbinding core by extending the definition of a deviation. In the traditional definition, players deviate if a profitable allocation exists after their deviation, while our new definition requires that all possible allocations are profitable. Therefore, the unbinding core becomes a superset of the traditional core. We examine some properties of the unbinding core. A sufficient condition for the unbinding core to be nonempty is also provided.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)39-42
ページ数4
ジャーナルMathematical social sciences
113
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2021 9

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学
  • 社会科学(全般)
  • 心理学(全般)
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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