The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values

Takaaki Abe, Satoshi Nakada

研究成果: Article査読

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We propose a new class of allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), weighted-egalitarian Shapley values, where each rule in this class takes into account each player’s contributions and heterogeneity among players to determine each player’s allocation. We provide an axiomatic foundation for the rules with a given weight profile (i.e., exogenous weights) and the class of rules (i.e., endogenous weights). The axiomatization results illustrate the differences among our class of rules, the Shapley value, the egalitarian Shapley values, and the weighted Shapley values.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)197-213
ページ数17
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
52
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2019 2 14

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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