Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms

Emiko Fukuda*, Yoshio Kamijo, Ai Takeuchi, Michiharu Masui, Yukihiko Funaki

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果査読

11 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid their true values. In the theoretical investigation, by applying the "locally envy-free Nash equilibrium" to the VCG, we found that the allocations are efficient and that upper and lower bounds of the auctioneer's revenue coincide in the two mechanisms. A laboratory experiment, in which the revenues and efficiencies were similar in both mechanisms, supported this result.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)438-461
ページ数24
ジャーナルRAND Journal of Economics
44
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2013 9

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

フィンガープリント

「Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル