Tolerance and herd behavior: Sophistication of ideas under payoff complementarity

Koki Oikawa*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

In this paper, I first show that there may be inefficient herd behavior even with a continuous choice set and a continuous loss function if there is payoff complementarity. Then, I show that the probability of inefficient herd behavior is asymptotically zero and the choice sequence converges to the optimal one almost surely if people have even a small amount of tolerance that they are willing to accept one another as a partner in joint work. This result is closely related to the argument in J. S. Mill's On Liberty, where he states that tolerance for others' ideas is essential for sophistication of ideas.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)539-554
ページ数16
ジャーナルJournal of Public Economic Theory
13
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2011 8 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 社会学および政治科学
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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