抄録
This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Furthermore, if F is a social choice function, (EPIC), (EM), and an economic environment are sufficient.
本文言語 | English |
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ページ(範囲) | 435-440 |
ページ数 | 6 |
ジャーナル | Games and Economic Behavior |
巻 | 75 |
号 | 1 |
DOI | |
出版ステータス | Published - 2012 5月 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 経済学、計量経済学
- 財務