Two-person ex post implementation

Yoshihiro Ohashi

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.006

Two-person ex post implementation

Yoshihiro Ohashi^*

^*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article › 査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Furthermore, if F is a social choice function, (EPIC), (EM), and an economic environment are sufficient.

本文言語	English
ページ（範囲）	435-440
ページ数	6
ジャーナル	Games and Economic Behavior
巻	75
号	1
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.006
出版ステータス	Published - 2012 5

ASJC Scopus subject areas

経済学、計量経済学
財務

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10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.006

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引用スタイル

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Two-person ex post implementation

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