Two-person ex post implementation

Yoshihiro Ohashi

    研究成果: Article査読

    1 被引用数 (Scopus)

    抄録

    This paper investigates the ex post implementation of a social choice set with two agents. A social choice set F is ex post implementable with two agents if F satisfies the conditions of ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity (EM) in an environment that is economic and has a bad outcome. Furthermore, if F is a social choice function, (EPIC), (EM), and an economic environment are sufficient.

    本文言語English
    ページ(範囲)435-440
    ページ数6
    ジャーナルGames and Economic Behavior
    75
    1
    DOI
    出版ステータスPublished - 2012 5

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Finance

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