Two-sided matching problems with externalities

Hiroo Sasaki*, Manabu Toda

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

50 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, we develop a model of two-sided matching markets with externalities. A new concept of stability of matchings is proposed and it is shown to be the unique one that ensures the general existence. Moreover, it is demonstrated that our stability does not contradict Pareto optimality. Some extensions of the model are also discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D62.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)93-108
ページ数16
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Theory
70
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1996 7
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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