Two-sided matching problems with externalities

Hiroo Sasaki; Manabu Toda

doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.0077

Two-sided matching problems with externalities

Hiroo Sasaki, Manabu Toda

研究成果: Article › 査読

47 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, we develop a model of two-sided matching markets with externalities. A new concept of stability of matchings is proposed and it is shown to be the unique one that ensures the general existence. Moreover, it is demonstrated that our stability does not contradict Pareto optimality. Some extensions of the model are also discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D62.

本文言語	English
ページ（範囲）	93-108
ページ数	16
ジャーナル	Journal of Economic Theory
巻	70
号	1
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0077
出版ステータス	Published - 1996 7

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

文献へのアクセス

10.1006/jeth.1996.0077

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引用スタイル

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abstract = "In this paper, we develop a model of two-sided matching markets with externalities. A new concept of stability of matchings is proposed and it is shown to be the unique one that ensures the general existence. Moreover, it is demonstrated that our stability does not contradict Pareto optimality. Some extensions of the model are also discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D62.",

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note = "Funding Information: * This paper is an outgrowth of our joint work {\textquoteleft}{\textquoteleft}Marriage Problems with Externalities{\textquoteright}{\textquoteright} presented at the 1989 Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society in Kyoto. The first author acknowledges support from the Ministry of Education and Culture under Grant in Aid for Science Research 06630011 and support from Waseda University under Grant for Special Research Projects 94A-99. The second author acknowledges support from the Tokyo Center for Economic Research. We thank Professors Marcus Berliant, Tomoichi Shinotsuka, William Thomson, Hidemasa Tsubonuma, and Takahiro Watanabe for their useful comments and suggestions on the earlier version of this paper. We are also grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out Ref. [8]. Any remaining errors are ours.",

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