Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games

André Casajus, Koji Yokote

研究成果: Article査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The principle of differential monotonicity for cooperative games states that the differential of two players’ payoffs weakly increases whenever the differential of these players’ marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them weakly increases. Together with the standard efficiency property and a relaxation of the null player property, differential monotonicity characterizes the egalitarian Shapley values, i.e., the convex mixtures of the Shapley value and the equal division value for games with more than two players. For games that contain more than three players, we show that, cum grano salis, this characterization can be improved by using a substantially weaker property than differential monotonicity. Weak differential monotonicity refers to two players in situations where one player’s change of marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them is weakly greater than the other player’s change of these marginal contributions. If, in such situations, the latter player’s payoff weakly/strictly increases, then the former player’s payoff also weakly/strictly increases.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)979-997
ページ数19
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
48
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2019 9 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • 数学(その他)
  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

フィンガープリント

「Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル