Welfare effects of forming a criminal organization

Ken Yahagi*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

2 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper develops a simple model to examine the economic consequences of two different criminal market structures in the private protection and extortion industry: (1) horizontal (decentralized) governance and market structure and (2) hierarchical (centralized) governance and market structure with a criminal organization. Forming a criminal organization produces positive or negative effects on its members and social efficiency. These results depend on the potential competitiveness among criminals and the ability of a criminal organization’s boss to target more valuable extortion victims.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)359-375
ページ数17
ジャーナルEuropean Journal of Law and Economics
46
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2018 12 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ビジネスおよび国際経営
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 法学

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