Welfare effects of forming a criminal organization

研究成果: Article

2 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper develops a simple model to examine the economic consequences of two different criminal market structures in the private protection and extortion industry: (1) horizontal (decentralized) governance and market structure and (2) hierarchical (centralized) governance and market structure with a criminal organization. Forming a criminal organization produces positive or negative effects on its members and social efficiency. These results depend on the potential competitiveness among criminals and the ability of a criminal organization’s boss to target more valuable extortion victims.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)359-375
ページ数17
ジャーナルEuropean Journal of Law and Economics
46
発行部数3
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2018 12 1

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welfare
extortion
organization
market
governance
competitiveness
efficiency
Welfare effects
industry
ability
economics
Market structure
Governance structure
Extortion

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Law

これを引用

Welfare effects of forming a criminal organization. / Yahagi, Ken.

:: European Journal of Law and Economics, 巻 46, 番号 3, 01.12.2018, p. 359-375.

研究成果: Article

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