Why Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Presidential Systems?

研究成果: Article査読

22 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Why do political parties join coalitions to support other parties' presidential candidates if presidents, once elected, are not bound to their pre-electoral pledges? This article argues that policy agreements made publicly between coalition partners during the campaign help parties pursue policy goals. However, parties cannot use pre-electoral coalitions to secure access to patronage, pork and government benefits under the control of presidents because they cannot hold presidents accountable to these agreements. Quantitative analysis of Latin American electoral coalitions demonstrates that political parties are more likely to form presidential electoral coalitions as the ideological distance between them decreases. Yet presidential electoral coalitions tend not to include non-programmatic political parties, even though such office-oriented parties are unconstrained by ideological considerations.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)391-411
ページ数21
ジャーナルBritish Journal of Political Science
47
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 4 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学

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