Zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Genki Ichinose*, Naoki Masuda

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Paper査読

抄録

Direct reciprocity is one of the mechanisms for sustaining mutual cooperation in repeated social dilemma games. Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies allow a player to unilaterally set a linear relationship between the player's own payoff and the co-player's payoff regardless of the strategy of the co-player. The original ZD strategies were derived for infinitely repeated games. Here, we analytically search for ZD strategies in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we present the forms of ZD in finitely repeated games, which are directly extended from the known results for infinitely repeated games. Second, for the three most notable ZD strategies, the equalizers, extortioners, and generous strategies, we derive the threshold discount factor value above which the ZD strategies exist. Finally, we show that the only strategy sets that enforce a linear payoff relationship are either the ZD strategies or unconditional strategies.

本文言語English
ページ284-285
ページ数2
出版ステータスPublished - 2020
外部発表はい
イベント2018 Conference on Artificial Life: Beyond AI, ALIFE 2018 - Tokyo, Japan
継続期間: 2018 7 232018 7 27

Conference

Conference2018 Conference on Artificial Life: Beyond AI, ALIFE 2018
国/地域Japan
CityTokyo
Period18/7/2318/7/27

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • モデリングとシミュレーション

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